Towards a competitive society? : the promotion of competition as a goal of economic policy by Sandmo, Agnar
         Towards a Competitive Society?
The Promotion of Competition as a Goal of  Economic Policy.
Agnar Sandmo1
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration
Abstract
This paper discusses the problems involved in considering competition policy as a separate area
of economic policy. Two problems are given special attention. The first is the doubtful
efficiency gain from enforcing competitive conditions in one industry when other industries are
not operating at their competitive levels; this is a classical problem in the theory of the second
best. The other is the justification for defining competition policy solely in terms of efficiency
without regard for distributional effects. It is argued that the concern for distribution is the
main reason why labour and agricultural markets, as well as the markets for public services,
have to a large extent been immune to interference from competition policy.
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21.  Introduction.
The aim of competition policy is usually taken to be the achievement of efficient resource
allocation through the promotion of effective competition. In fact, this is more or less a literal
translation of the official objectives of the Norwegian Competition Authority according to the
Competition Act of 1994. It is of considerable interest to note that it was not always like that.
The Price Act of 1953, which provided the legal foundation for the Authority’s institutional
predecessor, the Price Directorate, had among its aims the promotion of full employment, an
efficient utilization of production possibilities and the achievement of an equitable distribution
of income, and among its instruments the regulation of prices and dividends was accorded a
degree of prominence at least equal to that of the promotion of competition. While the 1953
Act defined the objectives of the Price Directorate as being more or less equal to the goals of
government policy in general, the new Act narrowed it down to the promotion of efficiency,
while at the same time stating that the proper way to achieve this objective is to create
conditions for effective competition.
It is probably fair to say that the new Act defines aims and objectives in a way which is much
more congenial to economists who approach this area with a background in economic theory.
But it also raises problems. Thus, by instructing the Competition Authority to abstract from
distributional considerations, the new Act is based on some implicit assumptions about the
separability of the goals of efficiency and equity which are not unproblematic. Moreover, by
effectively excluding some parts of the market economy (e.g. agriculture and the labour
market) from the scope of competition policy, the Act raises some fundamental questions
about the justification for efficient markets in the rest of the economy. Basically, the question is
3whether the Competition Act represents a sensible policy of decentralization. In this paper I
propose to approach this question from the point of view of welfare economics, drawing in
particular on the theory of the second best. Competition policy must fundamentally be judged
in terms of its contribution to welfare, and the relationship between competition and welfare is
one of the central concerns of welfare economics.
Before moving on to the substantial questions I should like to consider briefly the two central
concepts used in the Norwegian Competition Act, viz. efficiency and competition. In a specific
theoretical context the meaning of these terms is generally defined in a way which leaves little
doubt about their precise content. However, theoretical concepts usually need a practical
interpretation before they can be translated into the language of instruments and targets of
economic policy.
2.  Some History of Thought.
Economists are fond of quoting Adam Smith’s pronouncement on the invisible hand, by which
individual economic agents in pursuing their own interests are led to promote the interests of
society as a whole. While it may be tempting to see in this statement an early version of the
first fundamental theorem of welfare economics, this would be an idealization of the history of
ideas.
First of all, the concept of the public interest or the interests of society as a whole is a complex
one, and Smith never gave a precise definition of it. It is possible to read into his statements a
concept of the public interest as efficiency in production, as we would now say. Clearly, his
4conclusion that competition leads capital to flow to sectors of production where its rate of
return is highest, is consistent with a view of competition as ensuring productive efficiency.
But to go beyond this to a more general definition of efficiency would have required theoretical
concepts that Smith and the other early economists simply did not have. To define efficiency in
an economy with many individuals with partly conflicting interests was not possible before the
introduction of the notion of Pareto optimality, which again was built on the concepts of
preferences and utility.  Needless to say, it took another hundred years for these concepts to be
developed in the theoretical literature.
Second, Smith never gave a reasonably precise definition of what he meant by competition.
Stigler (1965, p. 234) comments that the concept of competition did not in fact receive
systematic attention in the theoretical literature until the 1870s, and that earlier it was «treated
with the kindly casualness with which one treats of the intuitively obvious». But it is clear that
Smith identified competition with rivalry between independent agents, and that this rivalry
would, at least in the long run, guide the flows of resources towards their most profitable uses.
Rivalry assumes at least two independent agents, i.e. the absence of monopoly, but the
conditions for rivalry would be more likely to obtain, the larger the number of independent
agents:
«If this capital [sufficient to trade in a town] is divided between two different grocers,
their competition will tend to make both of them sell cheaper, than if it were in the
hands of one only; and if it were divided among twenty, their competition would be just
so much the greater, and the chance of their combining together, in order to raise the
price, just so much less.» (Smith, 1776 (1976), p. 361.)
5The formulation «just so much the greater» probably should not be interpreted in a strict
mathematical sense. In fact, the first mathematical formulation of a model of competition in the
celebrated work of Cournot (1838) showed that such an interpretation would be incorrect.
From his work one can easily derive an analytical expression for the degree of competition. For
a monopolist the percentage markup of price over marginal cost will be equal to the inverse of
the price elasticity of demand. In a Cournot duopoly equilibrium with identical cost functions it
will be one half of the monopoly markup. With n oligopolists the markup will be 1/n times the
inverse elasticity. As n increases the equilibrium price approaches marginal cost, in which case
«the effects of competition have reached their limit»2. So the markup, the deviation of price
from marginal cost, diminishes with the number of competitors, but at a diminishing rate.
Cournot’s model was one of partial, not general equilibrium. The main step towards a model of
general competitive equilibrium came in the 1870s with the work of Jevons, Menger and -
above all - Walras (1874-77). When Pareto (1896-97) later laid the foundations for welfare
economics, there is a direct line forward to the emphasis in contemporary theory on the two
main theorems of welfare economics (first formulated by Arrow (1951) and Debreu (1951)) on
the equivalence of competitive equilibrium and Pareto optimality. With Pareto optimality being
the generally accepted standard of efficiency, it also became clear that the institutional
framework that could be used to implement it was perfect competition, i.e. a market system in
which no single agent was able to exercise market power.
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6Thanks to the precision of modern welfare economics it now also became clear to what extent
one could set up an objective standard for the «public interest» to be pursued by economic
policy. Under «first best» conditions, in which redistribution can be carried out by means of
non-distortionary lump sum transfers, efficiency would always3 be desirable as being in the
public interest. However, when such transfers cannot be made, matters are more complicated,
and a move towards greater efficiency would no longer necessarily be in the public interest in
the sense of leading to unambiguously greater social welfare. The further implications of this
conclusion will be discussed in more detail in the following.
This brief sketch of the history of economic thought on the connection between competition
and efficiency over almost two hundred years shows a remarkable increase in the clarity and
precision of the relevant theory. At the same time the theory also presents a competition
authority with something of a puzzle. With perfect competition being necessary for efficiency,
is any deviation from the competitive ideal a reason for interference? In order to answer this
question one cannot rely solely on the formal theorems of welfare economics. All acts of policy
interference are costly, and interference should therefore be based on a cost-benefit analysis.
With limited resources on the part of the competition authority, priority should be given to
interference in markets where the marginal efficiency gain, relative to the marginal cost of
interference, is greatest. Such a conclusion fits well with the looser concept of competition in
the work of Adam Smith and other classical writers: Competition may be reasonably efficient
even when it is not perfect. Most likely the prevention of monopoly is a more central task for
the competition authority than the attempt to push the effect of perfect competition to its limit.
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7Another important distinction for competition policy is that between permanent and transient
deviations of markets from the competitive ideal. Short-run variations in monopolistic markups
over the business cycle4 should probably not be a major concern for competition policy. Nor
should the high price charged by a successful innovator during the early life of a new product
be an argument for policy interference; in fact, the expectation of profits is an important
incentive for dynamic efficiency. It is the more permanent deviations from the standard of
competitive efficieny that should be the focus of competition policy, and it is accordingly those
that I have in mind in the following analysis.
2.  The scope of competition policy.
The deviation of monopolistic from competitive prices has in principle two effects. (A) By
raising prices above average costs, thereby generating pure profits, monopolistic pricing leads
to a redistribution of income in society, away from that which would materialize under perfect
competition. (B) By raising prices above marginal costs a monopoly distorts the efficiency
properties of the competitive equilibrium, the normal implication being that the use of the
monopolized commodity in consumption or production becomes too low. This is illustrated in
Figure 1, which assumes that the demand function is linear and that unit costs are constant.
The monopolist’s optimal output is xm, which corresponds to the intersection of the marginal
cost and marginal revenue curves, and this is to be contrasted with the competitive output of
x*. With m being the monopolistic markup (the difference between price and unit cost), the
monopolist’s profit is p = mxm, while the efficiency loss from monopolistic pricing is the
triangular area e = (1/2)m(x*-xm). In general, both monopoly profit and the effiency loss
                                                       
4 Bils (1987) finds evidence of  countercyclical markups, i.e. markups are lower during booms than during
depressions, and this finding, although not universal, agrees with that of a number of other studies.
8depend on the elasticity of demand as well as on the elasticity of supply (which in the case
shown is infinite). It is perhaps worth noting that in the special case represented in the diagram
it will always be the case that the efficiency loss is exactly equal to half the monopoly profit5; e
= (1/2)p.
While private agents who try to create a monopoly (sometimes with the support of politicians)
are motivated by (A), competition policy is mainly motivated by the efficiency losses implicit in
(B). An interesting question is now whether competition policy should be designed with both
objectives in mind, just like tax policy has to be designed with a view both to efficiency and
justice. I take the standard answer to this question, just as in the formulation of the Norwegian
Competition Act, to be no, implying that competition policy should be formulated solely with
regard to efficiency. Whether the answer is a good one will be discussed further below.
To which sectors of the economy should competition policy be extended? The view from
welfare economics is clear: To all of them! The aim to strive for is clearly to have price equal
to marginal cost in all markets. In the markets for consumer goods and services the implication
of this would be the equality between consumer prices and the marginal costs of production,
while in factor markets the rule would have to be formulated as equality between the prices of
factors of production, as facing consumers, and their marginal value products. Thus, the
general principle would apply to markets for primary commodities like agriculture as well as to
labour markets. As a matter of fact, these are both examples of sectors of the economy which
are fairly well protected from competition policy, and I shall maintain later on that this is
basically because of distributional considerations. It follows that competition policy must limit
its scope to certain - although large - sectors of the economy. In the next section I discuss
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9some problems that follow from this limitation, even when efficiency is taken as the sole aim of
competition policy.
Another area which traditionally has been well protected from interference by competition
policy is the public sector. Some decades ago the prevailing view was that competition was not
an issue in the evaluation of the public sector’s activities; in fact, in many cases it was
maintained that private competition was harmful and should be forbidden.  This has changed. It
has increasingly come to be realized that actual governments are far from the picture of the
night-watchman state which supplies a small set of public goods, including basic administrative
infrastructure. To a large extent the public sector has become a supplier of private goods, like
education, health, energy and communications, and in these areas private firms present
government organizations with both real and potential competition. The prevailing opinion is
now that this competitive pressure should be utilized to make the public sector more efficient.
Increasingly, therefore, competition policy has had to concern itself with the interface between
the private and public sectors of the economy.
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3.  Competition and efficiency.
In its everyday work on implementation of competition policy, a competition authority must
necessarily work on a market-by-market basis.  Faced with monopolistic price-setting in a
given sector, the aim of the authority should be to take measures which will lead to a reduction
in price towards the competitive level.6 This will promote effective competition. But will it lead
to a more efficient allocation of resources? The answer to this question depends crucially on
what is assumed about the nature of market equilibrium in the rest of the economy. To begin
with, I shall focus especially on the conditions in the parts of the economy which lie outside the
domain of the competition authority.  If some sectors of the economy are taken as being
protected from interference from competition policy, how then should competition policy be
designed inside its own domain?
This is a classic problem in the welfare economics of the second best. Indeed, it is one of the
central applications of the theory in the original formulation of that problem by Lipsey and
Lancaster (1956-57)7. What they showed was basically that partial or piecemeal reform which
appears to move the economy in the direction of efficiency, may not in fact do so. In particular,
suppose that there is one market where there is an exogeneously given deviation of consumer
price from marginal cost. This could be either because there is an institutional monopoly which
cannot be removed or - perhaps more convincingly - a tax wedge which is motivated by
overriding distributional concerns. Then it cannot in general be taken as
                                                       
6 The analysis here is cast entirely in terms of prices. This is not meant to imply that other aspects of
competition, such as quality or the degree of product variety,  are irrelevant for welfare evaluation. I
concentrate on prices mainly because it simplifies the exposition, but also because lower quality may under
certain assumptions be interpreted as a higher price per «quality unit».
7 The relevant application is actually formulated by Lipsey and Lancaster as finding  optimal price/output
policies for nationalized industries when there are monopolies in the private sector whose existence must be
taken as given. The nationalized industries in the Lipsey-Lancaster formulation correspond in the present
discussion to the firms which are within the domain of competition policy.
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desirable to have prices equal to marginal costs in other markets in the economy.
Why is this? There are two related explanations, one mathematical and one economic. To take
the mathematical interpretation first, the classic conclusion about the efficiency properties of
marginal cost prices can be seen as derived from the solution to a welfare maximization
problem. In that problem the only constraint on the maximization of consumer welfare is
production feasibility. If in addition it is assumed that there is one price which must be taken as
different from the relevant marginal cost, this introduces an additional constraint into the
problem. This constraint obviously prevents one of the first order conditions to be attained.
But because of the interdependence of the variables in the overall maximization problem this
also means that all the first order conditions will be affected by the additional constraint.
Hence the conclusion.
This line of interpretation does not give us a good feel for the economics of the second best
problem. To achieve this, let us consider the problem within a specific model in which the
structure is so simple that it can be analyzed by purely verbal arguments. To be concrete, let us
think of a model in which there are three goods - leisure, energy and a generalized
consumption good which serves as the numéraire. For redistributive reasons there is a
distortionary income tax, so that the consumer price of leisure, i.e. the after-tax wage rate, is
below labour’s marginal productivity. The assumption is that this price distortion is one that
competition policy cannot touch. I shall also assume that the substitution effects on leisure
demand are larger than the income effects, so that the consumption of leisure is too high
relative to the first best, i.e. labour supply is too low.
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Suppose now that it is found that the consumer price of energy is higher than its marginal cost
and that energy use for this reason is too low8. This is within the domain of competition policy,
and various measures are therefore considered which will lower the price of energy towards its
marginal cost. The question is: When is such a measure welfare improving?
Focusing on the consumer side of the economy, assume first that energy and leisure are
complements. A decrease in the price of energy will increase energy consumption, which is fine
from the point of view of efficiency. However, because of the complementarity a fall in the
price of energy will also lead to an increase in the demand for leisure. But the consumption of
leisure was already too low in the initial situation; hence the efficiency loss from the distortion
of the wage rate has become larger, and this has to be set against the efficiency gain in the
energy market. There is no guarantee that there is an overall efficiency gain for the economy as
a whole, although the price structure has apparently moved closer to the competitive ideal.
If instead we suppose that energy and leisure are substitutes, the conclusion will be a different
one. A lower price of energy will now generate a lower demand for leisure, i.e. an increase in
labour supply. The price reform in the energy market will counteract the distortion of the wage
rate and lead to efficiency gains in both markets and therefore for the whole economy as well.
The point of this analysis has not been to make recommendations for competition policy in the
energy market. I have named the commodities «leisure and energy» rather than «A and B» or
                                                       
8 Obviously, I am not trying to capture all aspects of reality which are relevant for the determination of the
socially efficient price of energy. Energy use has environmental effects which call for a higher price of energy
than its marginal cost of production in the usual narrow sense. Although I ignore this aspect of the problem, it
could easily be incorporated in a more complete analysis.
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«apples and bananas» in part to convey the view that price reforms as a result of competition
policy may be very important in terms of its consequences for the economy and certainly
comparable in this respect to major changes of the tax system. I should also stress that I have
simplified the analysis in some important respects from what one would do on the basis of a
fully specified general equilibrium model; e.g. I have taken no account of the effect of a lower
energy price on the demand for labour. But this is really beside the central point of the
example, which has simply been to show the fundamental implication of second-best welfare
analysis, viz. that piecemeal reforms do not necessarily lead to efficiency gains for the economy
as a whole. We can identify additional theoretical restrictions which are sufficient to ensure
that such gains will indeed emerge (Dixit, 1975), but these are very restrictive. Consider as an
example Dixit’s Theorem 7 (p. 118):
«Lowering the price of any one commodity towards its marginal cost will increase
welfare if the commodity is complementary to all those with a greater proportional
distortion and substitute for all others including the numéraire.»
In a particular case facing the competition authority conditions like this, to put it mildly, are
unlikely to be satisfied. But note that the theorem is an example of a sufficient condition for
welfare improvement; it does not imply that any other pattern of complementarity and
substitutability will lead to a decrease of welfare. Basically, the signs and magnitudes of the
spillover effects in other markets is an empirical issue that requires econometric measurement
and informed judgement.
Similar second best problems are also likely to arise within the domain of competition policy
itself. Thus, consider an extension of the model in which there are two sectors within the
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domain of competition policy. Let us think of them as energy and public transportation. In both
sectors the assumption is that the consumer price is too high because of monopolistic pricing,
and the ambition of the competition authority is to bring both prices down to the level of
marginal cost. However, it is not possible to take joint legal action against the two industries;
they have to be tackled separately. This raises some problems of priorities. E.g., if the energy
market has to be tackled first, the optimal policy to pursue in the energy market will depend on
the expected outcome of the reform process in the public transportation market. In general, the
optimal competition policy in each of the two markets will depend on the outcome in the other
market. If the competition authority should turn out to be unsuccessful in the energy market,
so that a substantial excess of price over marginal cost should remain even after the policy
interference, then the optimal outcome in the public transportation sector should reflect this. If
energy and public transportation are complements, this would be a strong argument for
pursuing the aim of marginal cost pricing in transportation. If, on the other hand, they are
substitutes, this would suggest that it is optimal to leave a positive price-cost margin in the
public transportation market as well.
This analysis suggests that competition policy becomes extremely complicated once we move
away from the unrealistic world of first best policy instruments. Regulators must always think
in a general equilibrium perspective, which introduces a number of interdependencies among
different areas of economic policy. Thus, in the example above the estimate of the efficient
price of energy should be sensitive to the magnitude of the marginal tax rate on labour income.
A way out of this difficulty is to institutionalize a decentralization of objectives by which the
task of the competition authority is limited to that of achieving competitive conditions, with
prices being equal to marginal costs. It is then left to other institutions of public policy, e.g. the
ministry of finance, to decide on additional measures in order to internalize the externalities
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between different policy areas. To return to the leisure-energy example above: If a careful
analysis shows that the optimal consumer price of energy is above marginal cost, the task of
the competition authority should still be to ensure that the producer price equals marginal cost.
It will then be the duty of the ministry of finance to propose a tax on energy use that is optimal
relative to the income tax distortion9. This tax should be determined on the basis of the same
kinds of considerations as were sketched above concerning the optimal deviation of the
consumer price from marginal cost.
This division of responsibilities has a number of attractive features, allowing each policy
authority to concentrate on doing what it knows best. Its appeal is strongest when in fact there
exist a number of other policy tools that can be used to pursue other objectives. If, on the other
hand, there are numerous political constraints on the differentiation of taxes, it becomes much
harder to argue for a narrow view of the objectives of competition policy.
Obviously, the conclusion to be drawn from this exercise in the welfare economics of the
second best is that there may be some difficult problems and challenges for the definition of
competition policy as a separate area of economic policy. A one-to-one allocation of
instruments to targets will only be optimal under particular assumptions on the availability of
policy tools and the nature of  political organization. What the implications of this are for the
organization of competition policy will be considered in Section 5.
                                                       
9 For an example of a second best tax analysis of this kind see Christiansen (1984).
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4.  Competition and income distribution.
One difficulty for competition policy is clearly that some monopolies have been created with  at
least implicit public support in order to change the distribution of income in favour of the
owners. This is perhaps most obvious in the case of the trade unions, which have always had
strong political support, especially from social democratic parties. However, over time trade
unions have won the respect, although not always the love, of liberal and conservative parties
as well. Similarly, agricultural monopolies have been able to count on the political support of
parties with a strong base among rural voters. There is now probably a political consensus in
Norway as well as in other countries that trade unions and agricultural organizations are
established features of the economic and political system. As such, they are more or less
immune to interference from competition policy10. To gain a full understanding of why this is
so, it would be necessary to widen the perspective of the analysis to take account of political
factors as well; see the discussion in Dixit (1996). Here I shall limit myself to a discussion of
the political and economic legitimacy of the claim of workers and farmers that their monopoly
organizations can be defended on the grounds of fairness.
If there had been no trade unions and no agricultural monopolies, would the markets for labour
and agricultural products then have been competitive? It seems highly likely that the answer is
no. If there had been no employers’ organizations, there would have been a strong asymmetry
of power in labour markets in favour of the employers. There are two reasons for
                                                       
10 I do not of course mean to imply that the market power of these institution cannot be influenced by economic
policy; indeed, economic history is full of examples to the contrary. But competition policy in the more specific
sense is usually taken to have no bearing on them.
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this. One is simply that there are many more workers than firms, so that the concentration of
power is on the employers’ side of the market. The other is that in many industries it is the
workers who make the heavy investments in particular jobs in terms of investment in firm-
specific human capital and choice of residence. Their individual bargaining positions vis-à-vis
owners of mobile capital are therefore likely to be weak. In agricultural markets there would
similarly have been a much higher degree of concentration on the buyers’ side of the market
(wholesale purchasers, supermarket chains etc.), while the industrial mobility of farmers is
obviously much less than among the buyers of their products. Trade unions and farmers’
organizations can therefore be explained and defended as the development of «countervailing
power» (Galbraith, 1956) to redress the structural asymmetries in the balance of power under
laissez-faire11. Obviously, the implication is not that this development will reestablish
efficiency. The point is simply that the magnitude of the distortionary effects of farmers’
organizations and trade unions on prices and wages should not be taken for granted but rather
be seen as an object of empirical research and measurement.
The social acceptance of some types of monopolies does not imply that nothing is done to
alleviate their possible adverse efficiency effects by means of public policy. A typical measure
taken by a competition authority against «normal» monopolies is to require the removal of
barriers to entry. By introducing actual or potential competition this results in lower consumer
prices and lower monopoly profits. Measures taken against agricultural monopolies, however,
usually take the form of price subsidies to consumers. Although not usually regarded as an
instrument of competition policy, such a subsidy lowers the consumer price towards marginal
                                                       
11 This answer to the hypothetical question of the likely outcome of the removal of the monopolies gains some
support from our knowledge that, historically, this is a reasonably realistic description of the situation in labour
and agricultural markets before the formation of labour unions and agricultural cooperatives.
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cost12 while at the same time increasing monopoly profits13. The two types of policy will have
the same effect on  consumer prices and on efficiency but opposite effects on monopoly
profits. The relative attractiveness of the two types of policy can easily be explained by their
distributional effects. In the case of trade unions the situation is less transparent, although it
can be argued that the adverse effects on unemployment of high wages have to some extent
been counteracted by the government in the form of selective employment subsidies and
creation of jobs in the public sector.
Many economists would argue that the creation and tolerance of monopolies is an expensive
way to redistribute income, because the distortion of prices will have a cost in terms of
efficiency. It would be preferable to achieve the same amount of redistribution through direct
transfers to the groups that one wishes to support, because this can occur without creation of
the substitution effects that impair efficiency. In other words, income redistribution ought to
take the form of lump sum transfers, a point well known from the general theory of welfare
economics.
But there are several difficulties with this type of recommendation. First of all, the design of
truly lump sum transfers which do not create unintended incentive effects is no simple task.
Second, even if it were possible to design the criteria for the allocation of transfer payments in
a non-distortive manner, they would have to be financed by taxes, and taxes do result in price
distortions and inefficiencies - just like monopoly markups. It is then not a question of
                                                       
12 Indeed, a first best optimal price subsidy per unit of output would be equal to the inverse of the price
elasticity of demand.
13 Let p and x be price and quantity and s the consumer subsidy per unit. Monopoly profits are then
p=px(p-s)-c(x(p-s)). Using the envelope theorem, we have that ¶p/¶s=-px’+c’x’=x>0, where the last equality
follows by substitution from the first-order condition for profit maximization.
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avoiding price distortions completely; rather, the issue is whether the tax or markup distortions
have the more adverse efficiency effects.
There are those that would argue that there is no reason to favour some people through
redistributional policies simply because they are in particular occupations; income support
should be given to the poor, not to farmers (some of whom are rich) or to particular groups of
workers (some of whom also enjoy high incomes). There is something to be said for this point
of view, but it tends to ignore the asymmetries of bargaining strength discussed above. Perhaps
what competition policy should strive for in these areas of the economy is to diminish the role
of such asymmetries, so that competitive efficency could become a real alternative to
institutional monopolies. However, there is probably no escape from the fact that some of the
asymmetries, especially in the labour market, are of a deep structural nature, not easily
removed by government policy.
An area of increasing importance for competition policy, at least potentially, concerns service
production in areas like health, child care, care for the elderly and education. In many countries
these have been areas where production has been dominated by public monopolies and where
the guiding principle has been to make the same level of service available to all. The argument
in favour of uniformity is a redistributional one, since it means that rationing of these basic
goods among individuals will not be based on their ability to pay.  But on the other hand the
uniformity of service implies a loss in efficiency, both because it restricts the extent to which
supply can be tailored to individual needs and desires, and because institutions that are
sheltered from competition are likely to become inefficient. The trend in recent years has been
towards increasing public institutions’ degree of exposure to competition from private
producers, and this trend is one that has been recommended by a number of economists; see
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e.g. Lindbeck et al. (1994). If the trend continues, it will move some important new areas into
the domain of competition policy and face policy makers with some difficult challenges. One of
the main problems in the area is e.g. to ensure that competition between public and private
producers takes place «on equal terms». This notion is undoubtedly appealing, but it is also
important to ask on whose terms. If private and public agents are to compete under
conventional  market conditions, it may come to imply that the original redistributional
justification for public production will no longer be able to count in the production of welfare
services; there is then a small step to full privatization of the production of these services. If,
on the other hand, the terms are defined so as to include standards of equal treatment, like
equal access, non-discriminatory pricing etc., the regulatory constraints on public agents could
easily become so restrictive that competitive incentives would lose much of their force. The
role of competition policy in this area will not be an easy one to define.
5.  Implications for the organization of competition policy.
The arguments in Sections 3 and 4 cast some doubt on the wisdom of organizing competition
policy as a separate area of economic policy with its own institutions and policy tools. The
general point is that a one-to-one allocation of instruments to targets is unlikely to result in an
optimum. Different areas of economic policy should really be seen as parts of an integrated
whole. Tax policy, trade policy and competition policy should, according to this view, be
designed jointly in order to internalize the spillover externalities between them. Attempts to
design competition policy with the single aim of achieving social efficiency through effective
competition may in certain circumstances do more harm than good. This line of argument has
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far-reaching implications, leading one e.g. to doubt the wisdom of organizing a competition
authority as an independent body outside the central government administration.
For my own part I am not entirely convinced by this conclusion. Having discussed some of the
intricacies of policy interdependence, I still believe that one needs to distinguish, using the
vocabulary of Krugman (1993)14, between the narrow and broad arguments for competition
policy. The narrow arguments are of the type that I have mainly discussed above. Although
welfare economics tells us that competitive markets result in overall social efficiency,
piecemeal reforms are not guaranteed to result in welfare improvements. This is first because
there are other distortions in the economy that may interact negatively with reforms intended
to stimulate competition, and second because of constraints on redistribution policy.
Competition policy, according to this perspective, has to be much more sophisticated than e.g.
indicated in the 1994 Norwegian Competition Act.
The broad arguments for competition policy are more political in nature. They recognize first
that the design of policies to attain efficient resource allocation is a very difficult task which
involves considerable costs. It has to be pursued along several dimensions like general tax
policy, environmental policy, trade policy and competition policy - to name a few. Each of
these areas requires particular expertise both among politicians and bureaucrats. Reforms must
be based on legislation, which takes time. A reform proposal which is contingent on the
existing level of a distortion somewhere else in the economy will have to be revised when that
level for some reason changes. The insights of  policy-makers and administrators which such a
policy requires is very demanding and may easily lead to mistakes. By pursuing the single aim
of perfect competition, leaving other aspects of policy to others, the competition authority will
                                                       
14 Krugman’s article discusses the case for free trade in the light of the insights provided by the so-called new
trade theory, which has emphasized the importance of imperfect competition  in international trade.
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probably make a few mistakes, but probably not so severe mistakes as it would do in the
attempt to carry out more ambitious and sophisticated policies. To paraphrase Krugman:
«[promotion of competition] is a pretty good if not perfect policy, while an effort to
deviate from it in a sophisticated way will probably end up doing more harm than
good» (1993, p. 364).
In addition to this argument, which emphasizes the transaction costs of policy design and
reform, there is also an argument which is based more explicitly on the nature of the political
process. Competition policy is an area where policy-makers inevitably face the resistance of
private agents who have a direct interest in preserving existing inefficiencies. If these agents
could legitimately resist the actions of the competition authority on the grounds that the
existing market structure had beneficial effects on the environment, the terms of trade etc.,
then presumably similar arguments would have to be admitted in areas like environmental and
trade policies. The result could then easily be that it would become impossible both to promote
effective competition and improve the environment. A decentralization of policy, although not
based on the most sophisticated of theoretical arguments, would be more likely to make the
economy as a whole move in the general direction of greater efficiency.
This conclusion seems to indicate that my detour through the welfare economics of the second
best was an unproductive effort, but I do not think so. It is by trying to understand the
theoretical complexities of policy design that we are able to understand the nature and
consequences of the simplifications on which policy must be based. Or in other words, to
appreciate the broad arguments for competition policy, one has to understand the essence of
the narrow arguments.
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